Why do firms publicly echo government language? Two common explanations are noise, under which alignment is payoff-irrelevant, and government consumption, under which the regime rewards aligned firms because it directly values alignment. We propose a third explanation: the regime can use alignment to screen firms for costly political support. We develop a contracting framework encompassing all three explanations and derive two results. First, absent screening, alignment cannot predict differences in firms’ mean payoff responses or costly actions when political stress materializes. Second, under optimal screening, lower-cost firms align, provide greater support, and receive more favorable treatment. We test these predictions using a transparent measure constructed from listed Chinese firms’ use of regime-specific phrases in annual reports. More-aligned firms experience larger valuation losses after an adverse political shock and provide costly support by retaining more workers during local labor unrest. Within our framework, these responses rule in a screening role and are consistent with optimal screening. [[pdf]](https://www.jorismueller.com/files/public_displays.pdf/)
Why do some economies recover from armed conflict much better than others? We provide evidence that political accountability determines whether post-conflict societies realize the peace dividend. We study Cambodia, where a nationwide landmine clearance campaign created large local potential surpluses by freeing arable land and reducing victimization by 48%. Whether these surpluses translate into realized development depends on accountability. Using a staggered difference-in-differences strategy, we show that clearance raises the probability of any nightlights by 7.3 percentage points in areas with strong pre-existing demand for checks and balances on political elites. Where such demand is weak, the effect is close to zero. Elite capture explains the divergence. In low-accountability areas, clearance increases land concessions, deforestation, land disputes, and labor displacement. Where accountability is strong, clearance instead raises household consumption by 22%. Post-conflict recovery requires not just the existence of a peace dividend but political constraints on its capture.
This paper provides evidence of the long-run effects of a permanent increase in agricultural productivity on conflict. We construct a newly digitized and geo-referenced dataset of battles in Europe, the Near East, and North Africa from 1400–1900 CE and examine variation in agricultural productivity due to the introduction of potatoes from the Americas to the Old World after the Columbian Exchange. We find that the introduction of potatoes led to a sizeable and permanent reduction in conflict. *Media coverage: marginalrevolution.com* [[pdf]](https://www.jorismueller.com/files/Agricultural_productivity_conflict_latest_draft.pdf/)